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Foreword 
Adaptive (path dependent) processes of growth modeled by urn schemes are important for 
several fields of applications: biology, physics, chemistry, economics. 
In this paper several macroeconomic models of technological dynamics are studied by the 
means of adaptive processes of growth. One of the models tackles the case when there is a 
separation within the pool of adopters which can be interpreted as the outcome of adaptive 
learning on the features of the new technologies by imperfectly informed agents. Others deal 
with dependence of final market shares of two technologies on the pricing policies of the firms 
which produce them. The stochasticity of the processes is caused by some mixed strategies used 
by the adopters orland imperfectness of the information which they posses. 
To study these conceptual problems some modifications of the basic results concerning the 
generalized urn scheme are given. 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences Program 
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1 Introduction 
The competition among new technologies is clearly a fundamental aspect of the process of growth 
and transformation of contemporary economies. So it is the competition among different firms 
which embody different technologies, different expectations and, possibly, show different market 
behavior. In turn, it is increasingly acknowledged that technological innovations are likely 
to  involve some forms of dynamic increasing returns, i.e., some positive feedbacks along their 
diffusion trajectories (cf. Dosi et al. (1988) and Anderson et al. (1988); for an interpretation 
of the empirical evidence, Dosi(1988)). To study the underlying competitive process a wide 
variety of mathematical approaches has been suggested within and outside economic analysis, 
e.g., ordinary differential equations (as in Polterovich and Henkin (1988))) in particular with 
trajectories on the unit simplex, i.e., of the population type (as in Silverberg et  al. (1988))) 
and generalized urn schemes which generate stochastic dynamic systems with discrete time and 
trajectories from the unit simplex (cf. Arthur (1988) and Arthur et  al. (1983) and (1987~)) .  
In the following we shall present some extensions of the later approach able to  handle positive 
feedbacks that  are only "local" - in the sense that  they occur only under particular states on the 
diffusion trajectory -, or the co-existence of both positive and negative feedback mechanisms 
in the competitive process (the simplest variants of the models presented here can be formally 
reduced to the ones considered in earlier works (Arthur (1988)) Arthur et  al. (1983) and (1987~)) .  
We shall apply these generalized urn schemes to  two topics concerning competiilg technologies. 
In the first topic, we study the dependence of limit market shares from some inised stl.a.tegies 
used by risk-averse adopters of the technologies. Conceptually, these mixed strategies, which 
generate some separation within the pool of adopters, can be interpreted as the outcome of 
adaptive learning on the features of the new technologies by imperfectly informed agents. For 
example, one may assume that  the later decide by observing the choice of previous adopters 
and "trusting" them, to  different degrees. Such a behavior is also easily interpretable in terms 
of "bounded rationality", and/or some interdependence in the returns to  individual adopters, 
depending on the relative frequences of the chosen technologies. Economic examples of such 
interdependences are particular clear with respect t o  innovation and innovation diffusion (cf. 
Arthur (1988), David (1985) and (1991), Dosi (1988), Hanson (1985)) whereby dynamic increas- 
ing returns and various sorts of externalities are generally observed. However, the modeling 
techniques suggested here could be in principle applied, with the proper modifications, to  other 
economic domains involving interdependence of expectations (such as those discussed in e.g., 
(Frydman (1982) and Frydman and Phelps (1983))) and speculation. 
The second topics we consider concerns the dependence of final market shares of two tech- 
nologies on the pricing policies of the firms which produce them. In the following, we suppose 
that  each of the firms until they reach a certain market share (measured by the proportion 
of units of the technology they produce among all units of all technologies which have been 
sold up to  that  time). Above that  share, prices are increased. An economic interpretation of 
such a behavioral hypothesis is that  firms - as often found in the business literature - follow 
strategies aimed a t  market pre-emption and a t  learning economies until they reach a dominant 
market position which they can exploit thereafter. Whether such pricing policies can be de- 
rived from strategies of intertemporal profit maximization under imperfect information or not 
is by no means essential to  the model. In principle, it is meant to  analyze the share dynam- 
ics of different technologies with endogenous prices (no mater whether the later microfounded 
on intertemporally optimizing agents or not). At each time, prices of each technology can be 
different but adopters may not instantly switch from one to another due to  e.g., imperfect in- 
formation, network externalities, etc. Indeed, the stochasticity of the process is caused by some 
mixed strategies used by the adopters in the case of approximately equal prices on competing 
technologies. 
Well beyond the two specifications of the model which we are going to present here, one 
of our aims is to  illustrate the general applicability to  economic and technological dynamics of 
generalized urn schemes which generate discrete time stochastic dynamic systems with multiple 
equilibria. Stable of them turn out to be attainable (i.e., they realize with positive probabilities). 
They represent those limit proportions of competing technologies which are feasible. In the 
following we shall use known results (Arthur et al. (1987a), (1987b), (1988), Hill et al. (1980)) 
concerning generalized urn schemes also some further developments. 
In section 2 we shall present the basic theorems on generalized urn schemes. Section 3 studies 
technological competition with imperfect information and endogenous preferences for the two 
technologies. In section 4 we analyze the case with endogenous prices. 
2 The Theory of the Generalized Urn Scheme 
Think of an  urn of infinite capacity with black and white balls. Starting with n, 2 1 white 
balls and nb >_ 1 black balls into the urn a ball is added into the urn a t  time instants t = 1 , 2 . .  .. 
It will be white with probability f ( X t )  and black with probability 1 - f (Xt) .  Here f(.) is a 
function (it is called sometimes (Hill et al. (1980) urn function), which maps R ( 0 , l )  ( R ( 0 , l )  
stands for the set of rational numbers from (0 , l ) )  in [0, 1.1. By X t  we designate the proportion 
of white balls into the urn a t  time t .  Then the dynamics of X t  is given by the relation 
Here (t(x), t 2 1, are independent on t random variables such, that  
1 with probability f (x) , 
t t (x)  = 
0 with probability 1 - f (x)  . 
Designate &(x) - E[t(x) = (t(x) - f (2) by Ct(x), then we have 
Due t o  EC(x) = 0 the system (1) shifts on average a t  time t 2 1 and fixed Xt = x on the value 
(t + n, + nb)-'[ f (x) - x]. Consequently limit points of the sequence {Xt)  have t o  belong to  the 
set B of zeros of the function f (x )  - x (for x E [0, 11). The following statement confirms this 
hypotheses. 
Theorem 1 (Arthur et al. (1987'6)) The sequence {Xt) converges a.s .  to the set B .  
Because we do not require here continuity of the function f( .) ,  then the set B has to  be 
defined properly. Put  
B = {x E [O, 11 : [ G ( X ) , ~ ( X ) ]  3 0) , 
- 
where g(x) = inf limk ,m[ f (xk)  - xk]  and a(x)  = sup limk-m[ f (xk)  - xk]. Here "inf" and "sup" 
are taken over all sequences of rational numbers {xk) converging to  x.  
It is easy to  see that  if all of the connected component of B a r e  singleton, then the coilvergence 
to  B implies convergence of the sequence {Xt) .  As i t  was shown in (Arthur et al. (1987b) and 
Hill et al. (1980)), if the set 
G = {z E B : Vc > 0 3 ~ ; ,  y$ E R(0, l ) ,  which belong to (x - t , z )  or  ( x , z  + E ) ,  such, that 
f(y,) < Y, and f(y,+) > Y,+) 
is nowhere dense, then the sequence {Xt) turns out to  be a.s. convergent even in the case, when 
B can contain intervals. 
An isolated point 8 E B we call stable if there exist €1 > 0 and €2 > 0 such, that  for 
€1 5 1x - 81 5 c2(x E R ( 0 , l ) )  the following inequality holds 
We shall say that  an  isolated point 8 E B is unstable if there exists > 0, such that  
for x E R ( 0 , l )  n [(8 - €,8) u (8,8 + c)]. 
T h e o r e m  2 Let 8 E B be a stable point, 8 E (0 , l ) .  Also there exist €1 > 0 and €2 > 0 such, 
that the following inequalities hold 
f (x) > 0 for x E R ( 0 , l )  n (8 - cl, 8) , 
f (x) < 1 for x E R ( 0 , l )  n (8,8 + €2) . 
Then P{limt,, X t  = 8) > 0 for every X1 E (8 - c1,8 + €2). 
Proof of the theorem is essentially similar t o  ones given in the papers (Arthur et al. (1988) 
and Hill et al. (1980)). We shall note only, that  the requirements on f( .)  allow to  shift to  the left 
for X1 > 8 and t o  the right for X1 < 8 inside (8 - c l , 8  + c2) with positive probability through 
a corresponding finite number of steps. 
T h e o r e m  3 Suppose that 8 E B is an unstable point, 8 E ( 0 , l )  and one of the following 
conditions holds true: 
1 .  into a neighborhood of 8 the function f (.) is continuous; 
2. there exists c > 0 such, that for z E (8 - c ,8  + 6 )  n R ( 0 , l )  it will be 
3. into a neighborhood of 8 for z 5 8(x > 8)  one of the conditions 1 )  or  2) holds true and 
for x > 8 ( z  < 8) it will be f ( x )  = l ( f ( z )  = 0). 
Then P{limt,, X t  = 8 )  = 0 for every X1. 
Remark 1 The condition 3) diflers from conditions 1 )  and 2)  because it permits that f ( x ) [ l  - 
f ( x ) ]  equals zero in a neighborhood of 8. (Indeed, condition 2) postulates positiveness of the value. 
In the case of condition 1) from continuity o f f ( . )  at 8 we have f (8)[1  - f ( 8 ) ]  = 8(1 - 8 )  > 0 
and, consequently, the positiveness o f f  ( x ) [ l  - f ( x ) ]  take place in  a neighborhood of 8.) 
Proof The case with continuous f ( - )  was studied in (Hill et al. (1980)) .  Under condition 2 )  
we can apply results from (Arthur et al. (1988)). Let condition 3)  hold and f ( x )  = 1 for x > 8. 
We argue in the following way. 
Note, tha t  
im X t  = 8 )  = P{ lim X t  = 8 ,  X, 5 8,  s > 1)+ 
rn t-00 
im Xt = 8,  X, > 8 for some s > 1 )  
p{?'OO 
It is clear, that  the second term here equals zero. (Because the process Xt, t > 1, cannot move 
to  the left from a point lying t o  the right of 8.) If f (.) is continuous to  the left of 8 we put 
for 2 1 8 ,  
i < x )  = 
min[l, x + k ( x  - 8)]  for  x > 8 , 
where k > 1. Otherwise 
for x 5 8 ,  
i ( x )  = { ; : ~ 8 ) / ~  for x > 8 .  
Using results of the papers (Arthur et al. (1988) and Hill et al. (1980))  we have for the process 
Yt, t 2 1, corresponding to  j(.), 
for every Yl. Hence for Yl = XI we obtain 
Consequently the first term in ( 2 )  equals zero too. The case, when f ( x )  = 0 for x < 8 can be 
studied similarly. 
The theorem is proved. 
Conditions of convergence with positive probability to points 0 and 1 are given by the next 
theorem. 
Theorem 4 (Arthur et al. (1983)).If f ( n w ( n w  + nb + t ) - ' )  < 1 for t > 0 and Ct,o - f ( n w ( n w  + 
nb + t ) - l )  < m, then P{lirnt,, X t  = 0 )  > 0.  Also i f  f ( ( n ,  + t ) ( n w  + nb + t ) - l )  > 0 for t > 0 
and Ct>o[l  - - f ( ( n w  + t ) ( n w  + nb + t ) - I ) ]  < m, then P{limt,, Xt  = 1)  > 0.  
The following statement gives conditions, which ensure convergence of { X t )  with positive 
probability to  nondegenerate intervals in every point of which f (x )  = x. It can be proved by 
arguments, which are similar to  ones given in (Arthur et al. (1988)). 
Theorem 5 Let (a, b) B, a < b, and f (x) = x V x E (a,  b) n R(0, l ) .  Also suppose, that 
there exist cl > 0 and €2 > 0 such, that f (x )  > 0 for x E (a - €1, a )  n R ( 0 , l )  and f (x )  < 1 for 
x E ( b ,  b + c) n R(0 , l ) .  Then P{limtdm p(Xt, (a, b)) = 0) > 0 for every X I  E (a - €1, b + c2). 
(Here p(y, Y) is the Euclidean distance in R1 from the point y to the set Y .) Moreover, if X t  
a.s. converges to Xo, then P{Xo E (a,  b)) > 0 for every X I  E (a  - €1, b + c2). 
In conclusion we shall note, that  for f(-) ,  which depends on time, i.e., a t  time instant t 
balls are added with probabilities f t(Xt)  and 1 - f t(Xt) ,  in such a way that  C t > l  t-'crt < cm, 
- 
Theorems 1-5 are valid too. Here crt = S U ~ , ~ ~ ~ , ~ I ~ ~ ( ~ , ~ )  I f t(x) - f x ) ) .  
Now we are ready to  formulate the main conceptual results of the paper. 
3 Sharing a Market of Risk Averse Adopters with Two New 
Competing Technologies 
On the grounds of the foregoing apparatus let us examine the dynamics of two competing 
technologies. Consider an adoption of a unit of the A technology as an addition of a white ball 
into an urn and an adoption of a unit of the B technology as an adoption of a black ball. The 
problem can be easily put into the framework of the generalized urn scheme. Let us generalize 
the model introduced by W.B. Arthur in (Arthur et al. (1983)). 
Suppose that  the two technologies, A and B, are identical in terms of some utility measure for 
the adopters. However, the latter are only imperfectly informed about them so that  they make 
their choices by asking an odd number m > 1 of adopters who are already using the technologies. 
An alternative hypothesis to the same effect is that there are positive (or negative) externali ties 
in adoption which change the returns to  the user along the diffusion process, but adopters in 
order t o  estimate them can only sample a fixed number of users. In both cases, we assume 
that  any new adopter will choose with probability cr the technology used by the majority of the 
sample m and with probability 1 - cr the technology of the minority of them. 
For cr = 0 or cr = 1 the model coincides with ones considered in (Arthur et al. (1983)). The 
probability to  choose A as a function of X A ,  has the following form: 
pA(xA) = ~ X A  + (1  - cr)(l - xA) = (1 - a )  + (2a  - l )xA for m = 1 
and 
Figure 1 
(2a - l)p(m, zA) + o(1) for m > 1 , 
. . 
where p(m, 2)  = CL(m+l)12 Ckz i ( l  - Z ) ~ - ' ( C &  is the number of combinations form m to i ) ,  
also o(1) goes zero as O(n-') uniformly on x E [O,1] for n -+ CCI (here n designates the number of 
consumers who have adopted one of the technologies). The function f (z)  = 1 -a+(2a- l)p(m, z) 
for m 2 1 is given graphically in Figure 1. Continuous lines correspond here t o  the case, where 
a > 112, broken lines - to  the case, where a < 112 and the horizontal line - to the case, where 
a = 112. Using results from section 2 we come to  the following conclusions. 
For m = 1 the function f ( z )  - z has for every a < 1 the only root z = 112. Consequently 
Theorem 1 shows that X t  (the proportion of the A technology on the market at time t ) converges 
with probability 1 as t -.* oo to  112. Consequently in this case the market is shared in the limit 
by A and B in the proportion 1:l. For m > 1 and a 5 1/2 completely the same arguments show 
that in the limit market is shared by A and B in the proportion 1:l. For m > 1 and a > 112 the 
function f ( z )  - z has three zeros: zo(a),  112 and z l ( a )  = 1 - xo(a). Consequently Theorem 1 
gives convergence Xi with probability 1 as t + ca to  the set B = {x,(a), 112, x l (a) ) .  As far as 
both xo(a)  and x l ( a )  turn out to  be stable, Theorem 2 assures that  Xi converges with positive 
probability to  either xo(a)  or x l ( a )  (from every initial approximation). Finally the observation 
that  112 is an  unstable point and Theorem 3 (the case when condition 1) takes place) show that  
Xi converges to  112 with zero probability (from every initial approximation). Consequently for 
m > 1 and a > 112 in the limit the market can be shared by A and B in proportions (each 
with positive probability) xo(a )  : [ l  - xo(a)] and [l - xo(a)] : xo(a).  
The arguments presented here demonstrate how results of section 2 can be used to  describe 
limit states for a given win function. Further we just mention that  corresponding results follow 
from theorems of section 2. 
Consequently the main new elements of this model comparatively with one, considered in 
(Arthur et al. (1983)), are the following: 
a) if m = 1, then for every a < 1 there is only one feasible limit market sharing in contrast 
with the case a = 1, where firstly, feasible limit market shares coincide with the whole 
closed interval [0, 11 and secondly, these limit market shares belong to  each of subintervals 
(a,  b )  E [0, 11 with positive probability; 
b) if m > 1, then for every a < 1, unlike the case a = 1, there is no monopoly market shares 
(because xo(cr) > 0 and consequently x l (a )  < 1) in spite of the fact, tha t  xo(cr) + 0 and, 
consequently, xl(cr) + 1 as cr + 1. 
From an economic point of view, the result shows, it is an "imperfect" process of information- 
acquisition (or endogenous preference formation) which curbs the tendency toward technolog- 
ical monopoly and allow an equilibrium co-existence of variety. (Note also that  this variety 
may simply be based on equilibrium distributions of diverse expectations on otherwise identical 
technologies, in terms of utility derived from them.) 
4 A Model of Competition under Implicit Preferences of Con- 
sumers in the Case of Approximately Equal Prices 
Let us now introduce a price dynamics for the two technologies. Suppose, that  two firms compete 
for a market of infinite capacity. Designate the firms and their products (technologies) by letters 
A and B. Also suppose that  they use the following strategy: until a certain level of market share, 
defined by the proportion of the product of this firm among all products which have been sold 
until the current time (usually greater than 112) they reduce the price. Above that  level they 
increase it.  Let us consider the simplest (linear) case of this policy. It is graphically represented 
in Figure 2. Here PrA(xA)  designates the dependence of the price of the technology A as 
Figure 2 
a function of its proportion z~ among adopters, who are using one of the technologies. Also 
PrB(xA) designates the dependence of the price of the technology B as a function of z ~ .  (Note, 
that the proportions of the technologies A and B are related by: z~ + x g  = 1.) By x i  and x g  
we designate the levels of market shares which switch from falling- to  rising-price rules. Hence the 
dependence of the price of the A (B)  technology on its proportion on the market xA(xB) is given 
by four parameters: PrA(0), x i ,  PrA(2X), PrA(l)(PrB(l) ,  x g ,  P r B ( l  - xb) ,  Prg(0)).  Note, 
that we account also for the circumstances, when P rA( l )  5 P r A ( x i )  (Prg(0)  5 P r g ( 1  - xg) )  
such as, when z i  = l ( z b  = 1): in this case, firm A(B)  still reduces the price on its product as 
its proportion on the market increases. 
It is natural to  suppose, that in the case when quality of the technologies is approximately 
the same and potential consumers know about it, the technology which is cheaper, has more 
chances t o  be sold, i.e., the A technology is bought if PrA(zA)  - PrB(xB) < 0. But if the 
prices differ slightly or consumers have some specific preferences (which can be characterized only 
statistically or on average), that lead sometimes to adoption of the more expensive technology, 
then the situation we can mathematically formalize in the following way (see also Hanson (1985)). 
The A technology is bought if PrA(xA)  - PrB(zA) + ( < 0, where ( is a random variable. 
Then the probability f(xA) t o  choose the A technology, as a function of XA,  equals to  P{( < 
Figure 3 
PrB(zA) - PrA(xA)) .  TO avoid unnecessary sophistications of the model, we shall suppose, the 
( possesses density with respect ot the Lebesgue measure in R1 (otherwise the event "PrB(zA)-  
PrA(zA)  + ( = 0" can have positive probability). Also, it is natural to  suppose, that [ has 
a bounded support. It means, that P{( E [-a,a]) = 1 for some a > 0. That is, adopters 
have a uthreshold" decision rule: above a certain price differential they choose deterministically; 
between they follow randomized strategies. To simplify our considerations, suppose, that ( has 
the uniform distribution on [-a, a]. Since random factors appear, when prices on A and B are 
approximately equal, then the following inequality a < mini,l,s,s,r A; holds. The probability to  
choose A as a function of ZA in this case has the form 
I 1 for PrB(zA)  - P r A  (zA) 2 a , f ( z ~ ) =  0 for PrB(zA) - PrA(zA)  5 -a , (3) [PrB(zA)  - PrA(zA)  + a] /2a for -a < PrB(zA)  - PrA(zA)  < a . 
This is graphically represented in Figure 3. Hence, the model embodies a positive feedback mech- 
anism of diffusion: prices fall with increasing market shares possibly due to learning economies, 
dynamic increasing returns, etc. and/or, on the behavioral side by market-penetration strategies. 
But the mechanism is bounded: above a certain market share, the price starts to rise, possibly 
due to  the monopolistic behaviors by the producer(s) and/or the  progressive exhaustion of tech- 
nological opportunities to  lower production costs. Finally, market adjustments as a function of 
differential prices are "imperfect": within boundaries, differently priced technologies both face 
positive demand. What can one say on the limit shares of such a bounded-increasing-returns 
process of diffusion? Using results of section 2 we have the following: 
1. convergence to  x i  with probability 1 takes place from the  domain I; 
2. from the domain I1 there is convergence with positive probability to  both x i  and xz; 
3. convergence to  xs  with probability 1 takes place from the  domain 111. 
In the terms of competing technologies these results can be conceptually treated in the 
following way. If the initial proportion of adopters of technology A belongs to  the domain I(III), 
then the technologies A and B share the market in the proportion x i  : (1 - x ; ) ( x ~  : (1 - x;)). 
Also if the initial proportion of adopters of technology A belongs to  the domain 11, then the A 
and B share the market in the proportion x; : ( 1  - x i )  or x; : (1 - xj )  (furthermore in each of 
the cases with positive probability). 
More generally: diffusion with endogenous prices and bounded dynamic increasing returns 
yields under the assumption of the model to  market-sharing rather than monopoly. Still, limit 
market shares are path-dependent: they are determined by history of the diffusion process. The 
model, however, allows a qualitative analysis - by no means restricted to  the price dynamics 
assumed here - of the ensuing limit proportions dependent on the relative frequencies of adopters 
of the  different technologies. 
Let us now turn to  the effects of different degrees of "market stickiness", as approximated 
by a ,  on diffusion dynamics. 
If a = A; for some i, then the corresponding horizontal part of the graph of f (.) converts 
into a "sharp", where f( .)  attains 0 or 1. If the distribution of ( is not uniform, then sloping 
(straight) line segments of the graph of f ( - )  convert into curve linear ones. And, finally, if a > 
max;,l,2,3,4 A; (in particular, when ( has an  unbounded support, as the normal distribution), 
then all of horizontal segments transform into "sharpsn of corresponding highness (from (0, 1)). 
In this case we can have the graph given in Figure 4. Here (as it follows from the results of 
papers (Arthur et al. (1987a) and (1988), Hill el al. (1980)) convergence with positive probability 
(from every initial approximation) takes place to both x i  and xz. Consequently regardless of 
the relation between the initial numbers of adopters of the technologies the A and B share the 
market in the proportion x i  : (1 - xi)  or xz : (1 - xz). Which one depends on chance. 
Implicit preferences of adopters (or, which is basically the same, preferences with imperfect 
information and 'market-stickiness') can be formalized in a slightly different way. Suppose that  
0 x i  2;  2: 1 2 
Figure 4 
if the difference of the  prices is not less than a > 0, then the cheaper technology is bought. If 
the difference is less than the value, then consumers t o  choose a technology use some stochastic 
experiment (i.e., a mixed strategy). Here a < mini=1,2,3,4 A;. Consider the following examples: 
1. A is chosen with probability p E ( 0 , l )  and B - with probability 1 - p  (usually, when there 
are a priori no preferences, p = 1/2); 
2. would-be adopters sample an odd number m > 1 of adopters who have one of the tech- 
nologies and choose the technology, which is used by the majority (minority) of them. 
Then the probability f ( zA)  t o  choose A as a function of z ~ ,  is given graphically in Figures 
5 and 6 (in the last case we neglect the term, which goes zero (see section 3). Note that  in 
Figure 6 in order t o  designate those parts of the graph where f(.) does not attain 0 or 1, we use 
continuous (broken) line for the  cases, when the choice follows the majority (minority) of the 
sample. 
Using results in section 2 we see, that  in the first case: (i) from the domain I convergence t o  
2; with probability 1 takes place; (ii) there is convergence with positive probability t o  z ; ,p  and 
x; from the domain 11; (iii) convergence to  z; with probability 1 takes place from the domain 111. 
Hence, the limit market-shares properties are similar to  those considered earlier in this section. 
However, consider now the  case of endogenous prices, as above, with endogenous preferences 
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for either technology, whereby choices corresponds to the option of the sampled majority. We 
have the following limit shares: 1) from the domain I convergence to  x; with probability 1; 2) 
convergence with positive probability to  both x i  and x; from the domain 11; 3) from the domain 
I11 convergence with probability 1 to  x;. 
In all of the considered cases monopoly (i.e., the situation when one of the technologies 
conquers the market) is impossible. To obtain monopoly one must change the relation between 
prices on A and B. As it might be intuitive if systematically P rA(0)  > PrB(0),  then we can 
have monopoly of the B technology. Moreover, if P r A ( l )  < P r B ( l ) ,  then we can have monopoly 
of the A technology. 
More generally, though, the model highlights the crucial importance of specific price dynam- 
ics in the determination of limit market shares. Some (more "evolutionary" inclined) economists 
might interpret the result as an analytical collaboration of the confecture that  out-of-equilibrium 
"boundedly rational" behavioral norms do affect system-level asymptotic states. Alternatively, 
one may argue that  all this simply emphasizes the dependence of limit market shares upon expec- 
tations and intertemporal discount procedures of supposedly perfectly rational but imperfectly 
informed producers of each technology. Irrespectively of the precise microeconomic assump- 
tion, again, the model allow qualitative analyses of the relationships between endogenous price 
changes, adoption frequencies and limit market shares. 
As an illustration, suppose for example that the switch point between price-decreasing and 
price-increasing stra.tegies occurs a t  less than 112 market shares. In this case, we have the picture 
of Figure 7.  Moreover, if price-dependent choice involve a random error uniformly distributed 
on [-cr,a] (with a < min;=1,2,3,4 A;), then the probability to  choose A as a function of XA is 
illustrated in Figure 8. Using results from section 2, we have: 1) if the initial proportion of 
adopters of the technology A belongs to  the domain I (V), then B ( A )  conquers the market; 2) 
if the proportion belongs to  the domain 111, then A and B share the market in the proportion 
x; : (1  - x;); 3) if the initial proportion of adopters of the technology A belongs to  the domain 
I1 (IV), the B ( A )  conquers the market in the proportion x; : (1  - x;). 
Consequently, under the given hypotheses concerning the behavior of adopters, massive 
introduction of one of the technologies (domains I and V), which is essentially cheaper in the 
domain, leads t o  its monopoly. Under less massive introduction (domains I1 and IV) we can 
have monopoly or alternately, A and B share the market in the proportion x; : (1  - x;). In 
the case of comparable initial numbers of adopters of A and B (domain 111) these technologies 
share the market in the proportion x; : (1 - x;). 
Note also that  the formal apparatus developed here can be used to  study all cases, whereby 
prices depend on the current concentration of one of the technologies on the market in an 
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arbitrary way (while here for the sake of simplicity we restricted the discussion t o  cases where 
these functions are piecewise linear). 
5 Conclusions 
Innovation and technology diffusion generally involve competition among different technolo- 
gies, and, most often, endogenous changes in the costs/prices of technologies themselves and in 
adopters' choices. In the economic domain (as well as in other disciplines) the formal represen- 
tation of such processes involves some dynamics of competing "populations" (i.e., technologies, 
firms, or  even behavioral traits and "models" of expectation formation). A growing literature 
on such dynamics has begun studying the properties of those (generally non-linear) processes 
that  innovation and diffusion entails. As by now robustly established, multiple equilibria are 
normally t o  be expected and "history matters", also in the sense that  out-of-equilibrium fluc- 
tuations may bear system-level consequences on notional asymptotic outcomes. Developing on 
previous results showing - under dynamic increasing returns - the likely "lock-in" of diffusioil 
trajectories onto particular technologies, we have presented a formal modeling apparatus aimed 
a t  handling the interaction between diffusion patterns, on the one hand, and endogenous pref- 
erences formation and/or endogenous price formation, on the other. As examples, we presented 
two stochastic models of shares dynamics on a market of infinite capacity by two competing 
new technologies. In the first of them, we assumed that  the adoption dynamics is essentially 
driven by endogenous changes in the choices of risk-averse, imperfectly informed adopters (or, 
in a formally equivalent analogy, by some positive or negative externality imperfectly estimated 
by would-be users of alternative technologies). In the second example, we considered an en- 
dogenous price dynamics of two alternative technologies, driven by e.g., changes in their costs 
of production and/or by the intertemporal behaviors of their producers. 
In both cases, the diffusion process is allowed t o  embody some stochasticity, due to  e.g., 
"imperfect" learning from other people's choices, marginal and formally undetectable differences 
in users' preferences, or some inertia in adjusting between differently prices but identical-return 
technologies. 
The formal apparatus presented here, based on a few refinements on generalized urn schemes, 
allows quite general analytical accounts of the relationships between some system-parameters 
(e.g., proxies for information "imperfection" by adopters; dynamic increasing returns and mo- 
nopolistic exploitation of new technologies by their producers) and limit market shares. While 
path-dependency (i.e., "history matters") applies throughout, the foregoing analytical techniques 
appear to  be able, a t  the very least, to discriminate those which turn out t o  be feasible limit 
equilibria (i.e., those which are attainable with positive probabilities) and, also, t o  "map" them 
into relative frequences of adopters. 
As the  foregoing modeling illustrations show, "market imperfections" and "informational 
imperfections" often tend t o  foster technological variety, i.e., the equilibrium co-existence of 
different technologies and firms. Moreover, stochasticity in the choice process may well bifur- 
cate limit market-shares outcomes. Finally, i t  is shown, corporate pricing strategies-possibly 
based on rationally-bounded procedures, imperfect informational and systematically "wrong" 
expectation-formation mechanisms - are generally bound t o  influence long-term outcomes. Un- 
der all these circumstances, the foregoing modeling techniques allow, a t  the very least, a "quali- 
tative" analytical assessment of diffusion/competition processes by no means restricted t o  those 
circumstances whereby microeconomic expectations, on average, represent unbiased estimations 
of the  future. 
If all this analytical representation is empirically adequate, there seem to  no a priori reasons 
t o  restrict i t  t o  technological dynamics. In fact, under suitable modifications, it may apply as 
well to  interdependent expectations, decisions and returns on e.g., industrial or financial markets. 
Ultimately, what we have tried to  implemeilt is a relatively general analytical apparatus a.ble t o  
handle a t  least some qualitative properties of dynamic stochastic processes characterized by both 
positive, and, possibly negative, feedbacks of a functional form as "badly-behaved" as possible. 
Indeed, we believe, quite a few of the processes of economic change fall into this category, related 
to  technological change but also to  interdependent (possibly "disequilibrium") changes in e.g., 
industrial structures, but also financia.1 or product-market expectations and behaviors. 
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